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STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S. BENNETT, WALLACE 
F. BENNETT, and H A R O L D H. 
BENNETT, Trustees, dba THE BEN-
NETT ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ARNEL K. DOWNARD, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLARIS E. JOHNSON and VELMA 
JOHNSON and BOYD J. CLARK 
and IRIS J. CLARK, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants were co-defendants with Arnel K. Down-
ard in an action brought by plaintiff, Bennett's Associa-
tion for judgment against defendants, Downard, for ma-
terials furnished Downard as a general contractor and 
against defendants, Johnson and Clark, as the owner 
of the property the materials were used on under 14-2-1 
Case No. 
13740 
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and 14-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, defendant, Downard cross-
claimed for any judgment granted against him in favor 
of Bennett's Association and for the balance due on his 
contract with Taco Siesta International. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was submitted to the jury on two special 
interrogatories as follows: 
1) Do you find it proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Bennett's made demand 
upon defendant Johnson to exhibit the contrac-
tion bond in question before the action was filed 
and that he did not reasonably comply? 
Answer: Yes. 
2) Do you find it proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence that defendant, Johnson, was 
a party to the contract marked, "Defendant's 
Exhibit 1?" 
Answer: Yes, 
As a result of the foregoing answers to special in-
terrogatories ,the court entered judgment against appel-
lants as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs have judgment against defendants 
Claris E. Johnson, Velma Johnson, Boyd J. Clark and 
Iris J. Clark, and that said defendants be jointly and 
severally liable with defendant Downard on said judg-
ment in the sum of $1,652.00 with interest in the sum 
of $497.00, and court costs in the sum of $72.00, for a 
total judgment in the sum of $2,221.00. 
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2. That defendant Downard have judgment over 
against defendants Claris E, Johnson, Velma Johnson, 
Boyd J. Clark and Iris J. Clark in the sum of $2,221.00 
representing the amount of the judgment that has been 
rendered against defendant Downard, or any amount 
defendant Downard is forced to pay as a result of the 
judgment heretofore entered and further defendant 
Downard is entitled to judgment against defendants 
Claris E. Johnson, Velma Johnson, Boyd J. Clark, and 
Iris J. Clark in the sum of $1,028.19 together with inter-
est in the sum of $308.40, and court costs in the sum of 
$17.50, for a total judgment in the sum of $1,354.09. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants Johnson and Clark seek a reversal of 
the verdict and judgment against them. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The record on appeal consists of two volumes, one 
of which consisits of the pleadings, minute entries and 
similar papers. All references to this volume are desig-
nated by the letter "R." The other volume consisits of 
the transcript of the testimony and proceedings held 
May 1,1974. All references to this volume are designated 
by the letter, "T." 
Defendants, Johnson and Clark, were the owners of 
real property located in South Ogden, Weber County, 
Utah. They were contacted by a California corporation 
known as Taco Siesta International about Taco Siesta 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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constructing a restaurant facility on their property. As 
a result, a contract was drawn up between Johnson and 
Clark and Taco Siesta (Defendant's Exhibit 2) wherein 
Johnson and Clark leased the real property to Taco 
Siesta; that Taco Siesta would construct a facility on 
the premises; that Johnsons and Clarks, as lessors, would 
furnish Thirty-Two Thousand Dollars ($32,000.00) to-
ward the construction costs. The contract further pro-
vided that the lessee (Taco Siesta) would engage in a 
contract with a suitable contractor duly bonded for the 
construction of the project. As part of the lease agree-
ment that Johson and Clark had with Taco Siesta (De-
fendant's Exhibit 2), the funds borrowed by Johnson 
and Clark were to be disbursed by a proper officer of the 
bank and any unused funds to remain to credit of lessor 
(Johnsons and Clarks). Taco Siesta was to also pay 
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) as pre-payment of 
rental; said sum to be applied towards monthly rental 
at the rate of $50.00 per month; with rent at $650.00 per 
month to commence five (5) days after: a) filing of 
notice of completion; b) date premises opened to public 
or c) not longer than 90 days after construction funds 
available. The Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) check 
of Taco Siesta was not paid when initially presented for 
payment (Defendant's Exhibit 5) but was later honored 
and Taco Sies<ta failed to make the rental payments as 
agreed (T. 54, 55). 
As a result of the contract between Johnsons and 
Clarks and Taco Siesta, Taco Siesta entered into a con-
struction contract with defendant, Arnel K. Downard 
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(Defendant's Exhibit 1); the architect for Taco Siesta, 
Joe Lewis Wilkins, signed the contract in the place des-
ignated as "Owner," with his signature in long hand and 
underneath printed, "Taco Siesta for Clair Johnson." 
Clair Johnson did not enter into the contract with Down-
ard, nor did he authorize Joe Lewis Wilkins to append 
"for Clair Johnson (T. 52) and defendant Downard never 
claims that Johnson did (T. 71), but to the contrary, 
Downard knew he had contracted with Taco Siesta, not 
Johnson (T. 71, 72, 73). Downard did obtain a construc-
tion bond from United States Fidelity and Guarantee 
Company in the contract amount of Thirty One Thou-
sand, Eight Hundred and Sixty Dollars ($31,860.00) 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit B). 
Because of the apparent financial instability of Taco 
Siesta, in presenting the check that bounced and failing 
to pay the rent as agreed, Johnson instead of paying Taco 
Siesta the construction funds, paid them directly to 
Downard and the sub-contractors and materialmen by 
joint checks until he had paid Thirty-Two Thousand 
Dollar ($32,000.00) less the unpaid rentals due him 
from Taco Siesta considering that the unpaid rental 
should be an offset against the Thirty-Two Thousand 
Dollars ($32,000.00) (T. 54, 55). This manner of pay-
ment was with the consent of Taco Siesta representative 
(T. 41, 44). Plaintiff, Bennett Association, became ap-
prehensive about not receiving payment from Downard. 
Mr. Richard Winters, credit manager for Bennetts con-
tacted Mr. Johnson and in the conversation learned that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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there was a contractor bond written by the United States 
Fidelity and Guarantee Company through Eastman Hatch 
Agency of Salt Lake City (T. 25). Mr. Winters was 
given the name of the agent and the serial number of the 
bond (T. 25) and as a result, contacted a Mr. Squires at 
the Eastman Hatch Agency and was told that the bond 
did exist; that it did not accrue to the protection of the 
materialmen (T. 26, 85). Mr. Winters claims to have 
made a request for a copy of the bond or to exhibit it 
on request (T. 82). Mr. Winters admitted that he, upon 
contacting the agent for the bonding company, was as 
knowledgable about the content of the bond as if it had 
been personally exhibited to him (T. 89, 90). The court 
ruled that the bond (Plaintiff's Exhibit B) was sufficient 
and adequately protected Bennett's Association (T. 91, 
92). 
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' and defendants' evi-
dence, Johnson and Clark moved for dismissal of Ben-
nett's complaint and Downard's cross-complaint (T. 96). 
These motions were denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' JOHNSON'S AND CLARK'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS BENNETT'S COM-
PLAINT. 
Plaintiff, Bennett's Association, claim against John-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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son and Clark is based on 14-2-1, U. C. A., 1953, which 
provides insofar as pertinent herein: 
"The owner of any interest in land (emphasis 
ours) entering into a contract involving $500.00 
or more for the construction, addition to or al-
teration or repair of any building, or structure or 
improvement upon land, shall before any such 
work is commenced obtain from the contractor 
a bond * * * conditioned for the prompt 
payment for material furnished and labor per-
formed under the contract * * *. The bond 
provided for herein shall be exhibited to any 
person interested upon request." 
and 14-2-2, U. C. A., 1953, which provides insofar as 
pediment hereto: 
"Any person subject to the provision of this 
chapter who shall fail to obtain such good and 
sufficient bond or to exhibit the same as herein 
required, shall be personally liable to all per-
sons who have furnished material or performed 
labor under the contract * * *. 
The facts have shown that it was not the owner 
(emphasis ours) who entered into the contract with 
Bennetts but Downard who was contractor for Taco Si-
esta. And that there was no contract existing between 
Johnson and Clark and Downard. It is granted that in 
the absence of a bond or proper exhibition of the same, 
Taco Siesta would be liable on their leasehold interest 
for the price agreed upon (King's Brother's, Inc. vs. Utah 
Dry Kiln Company, 440 Pacific 2nd 17), but the statute 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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if it means what it says provides that the owner of the 
interest (emphasis ours) in land cannot be held person-
ally responsible unless said owner has entered into the 
contract (emphasis ours) for the improvements. There 
is no provision in law or equity for an owner to be per 
sonally liable for obligations incurred by the lessee with-
out the owner's authorization (King Brother's, Inc. vs. 
Utah Dry Kiln Company, 440 Pacific 2nd 17). There 
is a correlation between the statutes above cited and 
the mechanic's lien law of our state. 38-1-3, U. C. A., 
1953, provides that the authorization for the material 
furnished or labor performed upon which the lien is based 
must be at "the instance of the owner of any other per-
son acting by his authorization as agent, contractor or 
otherwise," The owner in the instant case did not con-
tract with the contractor for the construction of improve-
ments upon his land nor did he authorize the contractor 
to obtain materials and labor from Bennett's on his be-
half. The question to be answered therefore, is whether 
the lessee through his contract can make the owner 
liable under 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U. C. A., 1953. The an-
swer based upon the reasoning of King Brother's, Inc. 
vs. Utah Dry Kiln Company, previously cited seems to 
be in the negative. 
In the event that the court was to conclude that the 
lessee, without authorization, can make the owner liable 
for improvements constructed at the request of lessee 
or his agent (contractor). We must then look to whether 
a bond was provided, whether the bond was sufficient 
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and whether it was exhibited to any person interested 
upon request. 
A bond was provided (Plaintiff's Exhibit B). It 
was sufficient to protect Bennett's Association (T. 91, 
92), Deluxe Glass Company vs. Martin, 208 Pacific 2nd 
1127 (Utah). The testimony shows that there was a 
casual conversation between Bennett's man Winters and 
Johnson around October 29, 1969, wherein Winters seems 
to recall the request but at any event, both parties recall 
that Bennett's were given the name of the bonding com-
pany, the name of the agent in Salt Lake City and pur-
suant thereto Bennett's man Winters contacted the agent 
and learned of the existence of the bond and according 
to his own admission, knew as much of the contents of 
the bond as if it had been personally exhibited to him 
(T. 89, 90). What more would have Bennett's learned 
if they had had the bond in their hands. We submit that 
if there was a substantial exhibition of the bond to Ben-
nett's sufficient for them to protect their interest, the 
statute was complied with. After the suit was filed by 
Bennett's, a copy of the bond was furnished to them (R. 
4, 7). 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANTS' JOHNSON'S AND 
CLARK'S MOTION TO DISMISS DEFEN-
DANT DOWNARD'S C R O S S - C L A I M 
AGAINST JOHNSON AND CLARK. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The evidence is incontroverted that Johnson and 
Clark contracted only with Taco Siesta. In their lease 
(Defendant's Exhibit 2) there was a specific provision 
that the lessee (Taco Siesta) would contract with the 
contractor. None of the defendants, Johnson or Clark, 
signed the agreement between Taco Siesta and Downard 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1), nor was there any evidence 
that the architect, Joe Lewis Wilkins, was acting as the 
agent for these defendants. Johnson became involved 
with Downard only because of the apparent financial in-
stability of Taco Siesta and Johnson paid the money 
to Downard and the subcontractors so that they would 
get their money and Johnson would not be stuck with 
liens. Johnson paid Downard only with the consent of 
Taco Siesta's architect and upon the submission of an 
account (T. 44, 46) (Defendant's Exhibit 6). 
It is unbelievable that anyone could consider that 
because Johnson paid Downard the moneys instead of 
Taco Siesta that this created a contract with John-
son, and Downard is not entitled from Johnson and Clark 
the balance of the money due him from Taco Siesta. 
Downard was also awarded a judgment against John-
son and Clark for the sum of Twenty-Two Hundred Dol-
lars and Twenty-One Cents ($2,200.21) representing the 
amount of the judgment that has been rendered against 
defendant Downard or any amount defendant Downard 
is forced to pay as result of the judgment heretofore en-
tered against Downard by Bennett's. 
There is simply no legal theory whereby the con-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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trator who failed to pay materialmen is entitled to a 
judgment against a party with whom he has no privity, 
with whom he has not contracted and who has not agreed 
in law or equity, expressly or by implication, to reimburse 
him. 
Because there was no express contract between 
Downard and Johnsons and Clarks, if a contract existed, 
it would have to be based upon implication. This is not 
the case here because of the knowledge of Downard that 
he contracted only with Taco Siesta. 
"An implied contract between two parties is only 
raised when the facts are such that an intent 
may fairly be inferred on their part to make 
such a contract." American Jurisprudence, Vol. 
12, page 500, Sec. 5. 
In McCaffrey vs. Cronin, 295 Pacific 2nd 587 (Cal.): 
"It is said that an implied contract is one not 
expressed by the parties, but gathered from the 
facts showing a mutual intent to contract." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
From Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 17, Section 
4, page 557, it is stated: 
"A contract "implied in fact" * * * or an 
implied contract in the proper sense arises where 
the intention of the parties is not expressed but 
an agreement in fact creating an obligation is 
implied or presumed from their acts or as it has 
been otherwise stated where there are circum-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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stances which according to the ordinary course 
of dealing and the common understanding of 
men show a mutual intent to contract. It has 
been said that a contract implied in fact must 
contain all of the elements of an expressed con-
tract. So such a contract is dependent on mu-
tual agreement or consent and on the intention 
of the parties and a meeting of the minds is 
required." 
See also Restatement of Contracts Section 5: 
Gleason vs. Salt Lake City, 74 Pacific 2nd 1225; 
Kimball Elevator Company vs. Elevator Sup-
plies Co., 272 P. 2 563, 2 Ut. 2d 289. 
There can be no other conclusion derived from the 
facts than 1) Johnson intended to contract only with 
Taco Siesta; 2) Downard intended to contract only with 
Taco Siesta. Therefore, there is no contract express or 
implied between the parties and no basis for the verdict 
of the jury and the judgment of the court. (Baugh vs. 
Barley, 184 Pac. 2 335, 112 Ut. 1.) 
POINT III. 
COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUC-
TION NUMBER 2. 
The Court erred in giving instruction number 2 and 
particularly interrogatory number 2 in the instructions 
and the explanation thereunder for the reason that there 
is no evidence whatsoever that the defendant, Johnson, 
was a party to the contract marked Defendant's Ex-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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hibt 1. Defendant, Downard, admits that he contracted 
with Taco Siesta. No where on the contract does the 
signature ol defendant, Johnson appear and the record 
is completely devoid of any evidence that the statement 
"for Clair Johnson" was printed on the contract by any 
authority or consent of defendant, Johnson. The evi-
dence is all to the fact that defendant, Downard, knew 
that he had contracted with Taco Siesta. 
The Court further erred in giving the explanation 
to interrogatory number 2 in that there is no evidence 
that the defendants, Johnson and Clarks, knew that the 
contract had been executed and that Joe Lewis Wilkins, 
the architect for Taco Siesta, had noted that he signed 
as owner for Claire Johnson and that Johnsons and 
Clarks knew that an innocent person was relying thereon. 
In this respect, Downard was certainly not an innocent 
person because he knew that the only contract that he 
had executed was with Taco Siesta. Further, how can 
it be seriously claimed that Johnson and Clarks "delib-
erately lay back and secretly let others complete the 
project believing that he was a party to the contract." 
Johnson and Clarks as has been stated, at all times took 
the position that the contract was between Downard and 
Taco Siesta; that Johnson paid Downard with the con-
sent of the architect of Taco Siesta and only to protect 
Downard and his sub-contractor and to make certain 
that when the facility was completed that there were 
no liens upon the premises. 
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POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN THE VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
This matter was submitted to the jury upon two 
special interrogatories found in instruction number 2. 
Interrogatory number 1 is as follows: 
"Do you find it proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Bennett's made demand upon 
defendant, Johnson, to exhibit the construction 
bond in question before the action was filed and 
that he did not reasonably comply." 
Interrogatory number 2: 
"Do you find it proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence that defendant, Johnson, was a 
party to the contract marked Defendant's Ex-
hibit Number 1." 
In the court's explanation following interrogatory 
number 1, it stated, "If Bennett's made a demand to see 
the bond and they were reasonably provided with a sat-
isfactory method to secure the necessary information so 
that such information was reasonably made available to 
them, then there would be no material breach by John-
son." 
As stated before, on or before October 29, 1969, Ben-
nett's man, Winter, was informed of the existence of the 
bond, the name of the bonding company and that the 
bonding company's agent was Eastman Hatch Company 
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in Salt Lake City, Utah and that thereafter, he contacted 
the bonding agent and was informed of the existence of 
the bond, but was mislead by the bonding company's 
agent in believing that the bond did not cover Bennett's 
claim which was untrue, as was found by the court. At 
this point, Bennett's had all of the information they 
would have had had they examined the bond personally 
and had the knowledge in time to have filed a claim under 
the bond before the statute of limitations ran out against 
it and therefore, there was no material breach by John-
son and the jury failed to follow the court's instruction 
and had it done so, would have found in favor of John-
son on this issue. 
In regard to interrogatory number 2, the evidence 
is insufficient to sustain the jury's answer to interroga-
tory number 2 for reasons stated before and so as not to 
be repetitious, they are briefly, that Johnsons and Clarks 
never entered into a contract with Downard, did not 
authorize anyone else to enter into a contract for them 
with Downard, did not at any time intend to enter into 
a contract with Downard and the evidence is that Down-
ard knew that he was contracting with Taco Siesta and 
not with Johnson. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INFORMING THE 
JURY THAT IF MR. JOHNSON SUS-
TAINED ANY LOSS THAT THE BONDING 
COMPANY WOULD PAY FOR SUCH LOSS. 
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If any explanation ran be made for the jury, answer-
ing the interrogatories numbers 1 and 2, as they did, it 
may be very well found in the comments of the court 
as found on page 91 and 92 of the transcript, wherein 
the court informs the jury as to its determination that 
the bond is sufficient, makes an explanation of bonds 
in general and states as follows, "The bonding company 
insofar as the court is aware, is still valid, solvent and 
will stand any loss Mr. Johnson takes in this matter. 
That is true, if Mr. Johnson suffers a loss merely be-
cause he is a landowner/' 
This statement was objected to by counsel, but to 
no avail, and the court did not attempt to rectify the 
situation. 
To a jury that perhaps could not remember the 
assertions or denials of the parties; to fail to understand, 
"Preponderance of evidence" or to remember all of the 
evidence, this gave them the easy out because then no 
one would be hurt because Downard could be given a 
judgment against Johnson, Johnson could make a claim 
against the bonding company which would not occasion 
him a loss and the bonding company was not in court. 
CONCLUSION 
There was insufficient evidence to warrant a sub-
mission of the case to the jury. Defendant Johnson's and 
Clark's motion should have been granted. There was 
insufficient evidence upon which the jury could answer 
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the interrogaftories as they did and therefore, the judg-
ment against Johnsons and Clarks in favor of Bennett's 
and Downard should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE B. HANDY 
Attorney for Defendants, 
Johnson and Clark 
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